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INTRODUCTION

"Ready or not, here I come." For years that phrase was the cry
heard during a childhood game. Today, in the most significant and
complex litigation in our nation, that silent cry is heard as the judge
decides what scientific evidence is reliable, relevant, and therefore admissible. Texas trial judges have joined the ranks of the federal judiciary and most other state judges as the gatekeepers for the
admissibility of expert evidence in court.'
The United States Supreme Court has expressed its confidence in
the ability of the federal trial judge to perform this gate-keeping function.2 In Texas the question arises: Do Texas trial judges possess the
qualifications, experience, and capacity to determine the admissibility
of expert evidence under Rule 702 of the Texas Rules of Evidence? 3
1. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1995).
2. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993).
3. See Kelly v. State, 824 S.W.2d 568, 576 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (Clinton, J.,
concurring). Judge Clinton in his concurring opinion stated that:
The greatest advantage of the Frye test is that it essentially leaves the question of validity of novel theories and techniques to those whose vocation it is
to view the world from the perspective of the scientific method, viz: the
scientists. Trial judges are ill equipped to make the determination whether a
given theory or technique has been sufficiently "tested in the crucible of controlled experimentation and study" that it can accurately be said to gauge
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This article will look at the results of a survey conducted among
Texas judges regarding their background, experience, training, and
confidence in performing this gate-keeping function. First, it is important to review the history of judicial decision-making as it applies to
the admissibility of expert testimony. What have been the legal guidelines for admissibility and how has the recent case law changed those
legal standards? Second, what did the survey of Texas judges tell us
about their education and perceived ability to perform the gate-keeping role? Finally, what future issues does the judicial gate-keeping
rule raise for experts, lawyers, and the judiciary itself?
II.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE EVIDENTIARY TEST FOR THE

ADMISSIBILITY OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE

A. Admissibility Tests
For years the trial courts of our nation have applied the "general
acceptance" test as pronounced in Frye v. United States, 4 in deciding
the admissibility of scientific and expert testimony. Frye held that expert opinion based on a scientific technique is admissible when the
technique is "generally accepted" as reliable in the relevant scientific
community.' However, the United States Supreme Court in the 1993
decision Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc.,6 determined
that when a court is faced with the proffer of expert testimony under
the provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence 702, 7
[T]he trial judge must decide at the outset, pursuant to Rule 104(a),
whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowledge
that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact
in issue. This entails a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically
the probability of the existence, vel non, of a fact in issue. The Frye rule

does not require him to make this determination. Instead it requires him to
decide whether scientists themselves believe the theory or technique has
been sufficiently tested.
Id. (footnote omitted).
4. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
5. See id. at 1014. In fact, the Frye Court stated that:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this
twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and
while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a
well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the
deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
Id.
6. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

7. Rule 702 provides that "[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." FED. R. EvID.
702.
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valid and of whether that reasoning
or methodology properly can be
8
applied to the facts in issue.
Therefore, judges will be required to evaluate, among other things,
the scientific reasoning and methodology made the basis of the opinions of an expert witness to determine the admissibility of such expert
testimony.
The United States Supreme Court in Daubert stated it is "confident
that federal judges possess the capacity to undertake this review" of
scientific reasoning and methodology to determine the admissibility of
expert testimony.9 Texas has enacted an evidentiary rule dealing with
expert testimony which mirrors Federal Rule of Evidence 702, while
also mimicking the obligation on the trial court in Rule 104 to make
the preliminary determination of admissibility of evidence.1 ° Hence,
the question must be asked: Do Texas state judges possess that same
confident capacity for scientific evidence evaluation as the federal
judiciary?
B.

Research Literature

What is astonishing about the Daubert decision is the immediate
explosion of articles, law reviews, case notes, and papers that have
been published discussing the possible effects of the Supreme Court's
holding. A preliminary review of the literature will reveal more than
500 articles which discuss the implications of Daubert on the admissibility of certain scientific evidence and expert testimony written within
eighteen months of the Court's decision," and the prolific discussions
and publications dealing with the test for the admissibility of scientific
evidence have only continued since that time with more than 1,670
law review and journal articles now discussing Daubert applications. 2
For many years, the courts have become increasingly uncomfortable
with the ever-expanding area of scientific expertise, particularly in the
area of social or behavioral sciences where an expert always seems
ready to give the definitive opinion of human or social behavior in a
8. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592 (footnote omitted).
9. Id. at 593. But see Daubert, 509 U.S. at 600 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring and
dissenting). The dissent stated, "I defer to no one in my confidence in federal judges;
but I am at a loss to know what is meant when it is said that the scientific status of a
theory depends on its 'falsifiability,' and I suspect some of them will be, too." Id.
10. FED. R. EvID. 104(a) provides:
(a) Questions of admissibility generally. Preliminary questions concerning
the qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or
the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the
provisions of subdivision (b). In making its determination it is not bound by
the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges.
Id.
11. Search of WESTLAW for records containing Daubert from 12/01/93 to 07/01/
95.
12. Search of WESTLAW for records containing Daubert from 02/01/93 to 05/01/
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particular case. The trial courts have struggled with whether an opinion has gained "general acceptance" in the field or whether the opinion is based on new or "junk science."' 3 In 1983, at a Symposium on
Science and Rules of Evidence sponsored by the National Conference
of Lawyers and Scientists, the confines of the Frye test were found
unsatisfying to a proper determination and screening of the admissibility of scientific evidence.14
Although much has been written about how Daubert might be applied in the analysis of certain scientific evidence, the literature is void
of evaluation as to what qualifications are possessed by the judiciary
to accomplish the required evidentiary evaluation preliminary to admissibility. The law reviews are crowded with articles on: (1) what is
the future of scientific evidence in court;15 (2) specific application of
Daubert to a particular type of scientific evidence;16 and (3) whether
Daubert substantially changes the character of scientific evidence that
will be admitted during trial."
13. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 553-54 (Tex.
1995). The court in discussing "junk science" evidence stated that:
In light of the increased use of expert witnesses and the likely prejudicial
impact of their testimony, trial judges have a heightened responsibility to
ensure that expert testimony show some indicia of reliability. It is especially
important that trial judges scrutinize proffered evidence for scientific reliability when it is based upon novel scientific theories, sometimes referred to
as "junk science." Concerns over the abusive use of the professional expert
witness have led some commentators to call for the adoption of a reliability
standard for Rule 702 of the Texas Rules of Civil Evidence.
Id. (citation omitted).
14. See Bert Black, Science and the Law in Wake of Daubert: A New Search for
Scientific Knowledge, 72 TEX. L. REV. 715, 717 n.2 (1994).
15. See Margaret G. Farrell, The Function and Legitimacy of Special Masters: AdministrativeAgencies for the Courts, 2-FALL WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 235 (1997); Joe S.
Cecil & Thomas E. Willging, Accepting Daubert's Invitation: Defining a Role for
Court-Appointed Experts in Assessing Scientific Validity, 43 EMORY L.J. 995 (1994);
Anthony Z. Roisman, Conflict Resolution in the Courts: The Role of Science, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1945 (1994); Kenneth J. Chesebro, Taking Daubert's "Focus" Seriously:
The Methodology/Conclusion Distinction, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1745 (1994).
16. See Jennifer Laser, Note, Inconsistent Gatekeeping in Federal Courts: Application of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. To Nonscientific Expert Testimony, 30 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1379 (1997); John S. DeWitt et al., Novel Scientific
Evidence and Controversial Cases: A Social Psychological Examination, 21 LAW &
PSYCHOL. REV. 1 (1997); David H. Kaye, DNA Evidence: Probability, Population
Genetics, and the Courts, 7 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 101 (1993); Katherine M. Atikian,
Note and Comment, Nasty Medicine: Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
Applied to a Hypothetical Medical Malpractice Case, 27 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1513
(1994).
17. See Nancy S. Farrell, CongressionalAction to Amend FederalRule of Evidence
702: A Mischievous Attempt to Codify Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
13 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 523 (1997); Kaushal B. Majmudar, Note,
Daubert v. Merrell Dow: A Flexible Approach to the Admissibility of Novel Scientific
Evidence, 7 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 187 (1993); Arvin Maskin, The Impact of Daubert
on the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence: The Supreme Court Catches Up With a
Decade of Jurisprudence, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1929 (1994); Amy T. Schutz, Note,
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These articles focus on how Daubertworks in theory, what scientific
evidence is admissible, how to evaluate the science, and what future
areas of scientific evidence will develop under the new rules of admissibility.18 However, whether federal or state judges are trained to
properly evaluate scientific methodology to make a preliminary determination of reliability and admissibility continues as an unanswered
question; a question that the United States Supreme Court has sidestepped by stating that the federal judges are up to the task without
citing any evidence in support of that position. 19
C. Evidentiary Tests of Scientific Evidence Admissibility
Before we can analyze whether judges are trained to evaluate scientific methodology, what is the evidentiary test to be applied to scientific evidence?
1. Frye Test
The 1923 D.C. Circuit Court decision, now known as the Frye test,
decided that courts should "go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery."' 20 However, the D.C. Circuit Court required that there be
sufficient, established general acceptance of that scientific method or
theory in the particular field of study before expert testimony based
on that method or theory was admissible.2 1 Frye shifted the evaluation of expert testimony reliability by the judge and jury to the general
acceptance of such expert testimony within a certain field of study. 22
Judge Clinton in his concurring opinion in Kelly v. State,2 3 discussed

the advantages of the Frye test as compared to an ill-prepared trial
judge determining reliability. 24 However, the majority concluded that
the Frye test was no longer a part of Texas law.25
The New Gatekeepers: Judging Scientific Evidence in a Post-Frye World, 72 N.C. L.
REV. 1060 (1994).
18. See supra notes 15-17.
19. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 600 (1993) (Rehnquist,

C.J., dissenting). Dissenting Chief Justice Rehnquist states, "I do not doubt that Rule
702 confides to the judge some gatekeeping responsibility in deciding questions of the
admissibility of proffered expert testimony. But I do not think it imposes on them
either the obligation or the authority to become amateur scientists in order to perform that role." Id.
20. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. 824 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
24. See id. at 576.
25. See id. at 572.
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2. Federal Rule of Evidence 702
Promulgated in 1975, the Federal Rules of Evidence provided that
all relevant evidence (evidence that tended to make the existence of
any consequential fact to the issues in the case more probable or less
probable) was admissible.26 The courts then specified in Rule 702 that
expert testimony was admissible if "scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier 27of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue."
Further, under the provisions of Rule 104, the trial court was required to make the preliminary determination on the admissibility of
evidence such as that offered under Rule 702.28
3.

Daubert Test

In 1993, the Daubertdecision held that the Frye test did not survive
the Federal Rules of Evidence's promulgation. 9 Instead, Daubert
held that the Rules of Evidence were the test for the admissibility of
expert testimony.3" The Supreme Court emphasized that the evidentiary rules provided for a flexible inquiry into the scientific validity of
principles made the basis of an expert's opinion, but that the court
must make the preliminary determination of the admissibility of such
expert testimony.31
The Court held that the trial courts must make a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the expert
testimony is "scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning
or
32
methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.
D.

Texas Law on Admissibility of Scientific Evidence

1. Texas Rule of Evidence 702
The Texas Rule of Evidence 702 mirrors the language of the Federal
Rule of Evidence 702. Consequently, the courts of Texas, under the
interpretation of Daubert and Texas case law,33 should be engaged in
the same preliminary evidentiary evaluation as the federal courts.
2.

Pre-DaubertDecisions

Before the Daubertdecision, the Texas courts gave lip service to the
Frye "general acceptance" test,34 but generally paid little attention to
26. See FED. R. EvID. 401.
27. FED. R. EvID. 702.

28. See

FED.

R.

EvID.

104.

29. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993).
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. Id. at 593.
33. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1995).
34. See Duckett v. State, 797 S.W.2d 906 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990), overruled by
Cohn v. State, 849 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
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In the case of Jones v. State,3 6 the court used a Frye-test

analysis to admit the results of a gas chromatography/mass spectrometry test.37 However, the court recommended that the trial courts in
Texas should apply the following eleven-factor test in determining the
admissibility of this type of evidence. 8 This test includes:
(1) The potential error rate in using the technique;
(2) The existence and maintenance of standards governing its use;
(3) Presence of safeguards in the characteristics of the technique
(4) Analogy to other scientific techniques whose results are
admissible;
(5) The extent to which the technique has been accepted by scientists in the field involved;
(6) The nature and breadth of the inference adduced;
(7) The clarity and simplicity with which the technique can be described and its results explained;
(8) The extent to which the basic data are verifiable by the court
and jury;
(9) The availability of other experts to test and evaluate the
technique;
(10) The probative significance of the evidence in the circumstances of the case; and
(11) The care with which the technique was employed in the case.39
Even with case law attempting to set out a method of critical evaluation of scientific or expert testimony, the Texas courts found themselves merely asking two primary questions:
1. Whether the witness possessed a special knowledge, skill, experience, training or education; and
2. Whether the testimony would assist the trier of fact in deciding a
fact issue in the case.4 °

Under this broad evaluation of expert and scientific evidence, the
Texas courts became a battleground for the experts, and the bulk of
the evidence was merely submitted to the jury for them to evaluate
the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their
testimony.41
35. See Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Atterbury, 978 S.W.2d 183, 188 (Tex.
App.-Texarkana 1998, pet. denied) ("Despite years of relatively well-settled precedent in Texas in which no court has ever used the Frye test, the Texas Supreme Court
adopted the Daubert approach to admitting scientific evidence ... .
36. 716 S.W.2d 142 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986, pet. ref'd).
37. See id. at 152, 154.
38. See id. at 154.
39. Id. at 154.
40. See Yount v. State, 872 S.W.2d 706, 708 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Carter v.
State, 851 S.W.2d 390, 393 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1993, pet. ref'd).
41. See Kelly v. State, 824 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); Duckett v. State,
797 S.W.2d 906 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
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3. Texas Decisions and Precedent
Texas trial judges are now the gatekeepers of expert testimony admissibility in both criminal and civil cases. The Texas decisions of

Kelly v. State, 2 Hartman v. State,a3 E.L du Pont de Nemours & Co. v.
Robinson,an and Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc. v. Havner"5 have

defined and clarified how the Texas trial judges will determine
whether proffered expert testimony will be admitted.
These decisions direct that the trial judge, under the Texas Rules of
Evidence 104 and 702, determine whether the proponent of the proffered expert testimony has demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that the expert evidence is (1) reliable, and (2) relevant to assist
the jury in its fact-finding duty.46 To be reliable, the proponent must
prove that (1) the underlying scientific theory is valid, (2) the technique applying the theory is valid, and (3) the technique was properly
applied on the occasion in question.47
In determining reliability, the court may consider any number of
facts, which includes the following nonexclusive list: (1) the extent to
which the underlying scientific theory and technique are accepted as
valid by the relevant scientific community, if such a community can be
ascertained; (2) the qualifications of the testifying expert; (3) the existence of literature supporting or rejecting the underlying scientific theory and technique; (4) the potential rate of error of the technique; (5)
the availability of other experts to test and evaluate the technique; (6)
the clarity with which the underlying scientific theory and technique
can be explained to the court; and (7) the, experience and skill of the
person who applied the technique on the occasion in question. 8
If the trial judge determines that the evidence is reliable, the trial
judge must then determine if the evidence is relevant to the determination of a fact issue which is of consequence in the case.49 The balancing test 50 must always be applied when determining if evidence is
admissible.
The combined effect of Rule 104 and 702 clearly requires the trial
judge to evaluate preliminary issues of admissibility of scientific and
expert testimony, issues of reliability, and to evaluate scientific methodology prior to the admission of expert opinions.
42. 824 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
43. 946 S.W.2d 60 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
44. 923 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1995).
45. 953 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1997).
46. See Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 711, 720; Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 556; Hartman,
946 S.W.2d at 62; Kelly, 824 S.W.2d at 572.
47. See Hartman, 946 S.W.2d at 62.
48. See Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 557; Kelly, 824 SW.2d at 573 (discussing the
nonexclusive list of factors which the court may consider in determining reliability).
49. See Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 556; Kelly 824 S.W.2d at 572.
50. See TEX. R. EvID. 403.
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The Texas Supreme Court stated that Rule 702 "envisions a flexible
inquiry focusing solely on the underlying principles and methodology,
not on the conclusions they generate."'"
In its Robinson decision, the Texas Supreme Court expressed its
confidence that the trial courts would use great care in determining
whether expert testimony is admissible under Rule 70252 and that the
trial judge's decision would be weighed under an abuse of discretion
test.5 3 The test for abuse of discretion, as set out by the Texas
Supreme Court, is whether the trial court acted without reference to
any guiding rules or principles.5 4 Specifically, the court ruled that "[a]
reviewing court cannot conclude that a trial court abused its discretion
if, in the same circumstances, it would have ruled differently or if the
trial court committed a mere error in judgment."5 5
There is an important difference between Texas case law and the
Daubert opinion as pointed out in the case of Minnesota Mining &
Manufacturing Co. v. Atterbury.5 6 The court explained that:
[T]he Texas Supreme Court differed from the United States
Supreme Court in the confidence that it has in the ability of the
adversarial system to present, and fair and impartial juries to consider, borderline evidence. As stated before, the United States
Supreme Court favored admission of evidence on the borderline because the jury should be able to ascertain the truth through
"[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence,
and careful instruction on the burden of proof. . . ." However, the
Texas Supreme Court apparently does not share this confidence in
the adversarial system and the abilities of counsel. It stated that
judges are better at evaluating scientific reliability because counsel
often cannot cross-examine expert witnesses effectively "because it
can be difficult to explain weakness in57 the [expert's] testimony to
the jury and can make things worse."
In Robinson the Texas Supreme Court disagreed with the dissent's
criticism that Rule 702 "places a judge in 'the role of amateur scientist' and that judges are not competent to assess the scientific reliability of expert testimony."5 8 The court found that "[h]owever, a judge
does not have to be trained in science to evaluate the reliability of a
theory or technique. Judges are capable of understanding and evaluating scientific reliability."5 9
51. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 557.
52.
53.
54.
55.

See id.
See id. at 558.
See id.
Id.

56. 978 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1998, pet. denied).
57. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Atterbury, 978 S.W.2d 183, 189 (Tex. App.-

Texarkana 1998, pet. denied) (citations omitted).
58. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 557.

59. Id. at 557-58 (citation omitted).
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SURVEY RESULTS OF TEXAS JUDICIAL QUALIFICATIONS AND
CONFIDENCE AS SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE GATEKEEPERS

A.

Survey Parameters and Overview

Daubert's confidence in the ability of federal judges60 raises questions about whether Texas state judges are trained and able to evaluate the reliability of expert testimony dealing with scientific evidence.
A study of the education, training, and background of the judges
would provide information on this competence question and give insight to judicial and legal educators as to what areas of focus in both
initial and continuing education in the area of scientific methodology
evaluation may be needed.
To assist in this evaluation, a survey of the background, educational
experience, training and practical experience of all Texas judges with
scientific evidence methodology evaluation was conducted, including

a subjective question on what qualifications or education the state
judges believe are necessary to perform a Daubert test.
A questionnaire was developed61 and forwarded to all 685 Texas
judges 62 inquiring into demographic information, 63 the background,

education and experience of judges in the analysis of scientific methodology, and judicial perception as to their ability and needs to perform this gatekeeping role.
60. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993).
61. This survey questionnaire was developed by this author with the consultation
and advice of Professor Barbara Hart, Ph.D., of the University of Texas at Tyler and
Professor James Richardson, Ph.D., at the University of Nevada, Reno.
62. This is the total number of elected and appointed presiding judges in Texas
from the list of judges prepared by the Texas Center for the Judiciary, Inc. This association maintains a list of currently elected or appointed judges in Texas. Retired,
senior, and former judges were not included in the survey. Constitutional county
judges, municipal court judges, and justices of the peace were also not included in the
survey.
63. The demographic inquiries included:
1. Age
2. Sex
3. Race
4. Population of area where the person works
5. Educational background:
High school
College degrees (majors and minors and name of school)
Post-graduate degrees (majors and minors and name of school)
Continuing education courses (areas and number)
6. Educational background in physical, social or behavioral sciences (with
description of type and number of courses taken):
High school
College degrees (majors and minors and name of school)
Post-graduate degrees (majors and minors and name of school)
Continuing education courses (areas and number)
7. Jurisdiction of court and type of cases handled
8. Description of type of practice or business
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An analysis of the survey data provides insight as to the qualifications for Daubert analysis possessed by the Texas judiciary and addresses the following questions:
1. What qualifications, training, experience and background in
evaluating Daubert evidence is generally found among the
Texas judiciary?
2. What qualifications, training, experience and background do
members of the Texas judiciary believe is necessary to make a
Daubert evaluation of reliability?
3. What training and education is provided by Texas Continuing
Judicial Education Programs on scientific methodology
evaluation?
The survey's answers to these questions merely raised an entire new
set of questions about the extent of the Texas judges' ability to perform the gatekeeping role, the best method for preparing Texas judges
to gate keep, and concerns about the uniform application of the
gatekeeping function in Texas courts.
B.

Survey Respondents and Definitions

Of the 685 judicial questionnaires which were sent to Texas judges,
331 responses were received. This was an excellent return rate of 48
percent of the total population of judges, and the returns certainly
were a representative cross-section of the Texas judiciary.6 4
64. The demographics of the responses were as follows:
TYPE OF COURT:
Texas Supreme Court
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Court of Appeals
General District Court
Civil District Court
Criminal District Court
Juvenile Court
Probate Court
County Court at Law Civil
County Court at Law Criminal
General County Court at Law
County Court

4
6
29
128
43
15
4
6
11
22
60
3

POPULATION OF AREA SERVED:
39
Less than 50,000
75
50,000 to 150,000
31
150,000 to 250,000
39
250,000 to 500,000
32
500,000 to 1,000,000
106
Over 1,000,000
9
No response
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In the survey the judges were asked to describe their educational
background in the use or analysis of the "scientific method."65 With
the instructions as to the purpose of the survey,6 6 the judges were
asked sixteen questions.6 7

C. Survey Results of Judges' Scientific Methodology Background,
Education, and Training6 8

The results of the judicial survey show that over 13 percent of the
judges did not report any instruction or educational background in the
scientific method received during high school. Although 87 percent
AGE OF JUDGES:
Less than 40
Over 40 and less than 50
Over 50 and less than 60
Over 60 and less than 70
Over 70
No response

32
129
109
47
12
2

SEX:
Male
Female
No response

272
58
1

RACE:
Caucasian
289
African-American
3
Mexican-American
26
Oriental
1
Native American
0
Other
11
No Response
5
65. The survey questionnaire defined the term "scientific methodology" as
follows:
For purposes of this questionnaire, the term "scientific methodology" is defined as set out in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2796
(1993) as, "The process of generating hypotheses and testing them to determine if they can be falsified is called "scientific methodology." Put another
way, "scientific methodology" involves a process of 1) stating a problem, 2)
gathering information, 3) forming a hypothesis, 4) testing the hypothesis, 5)
drawing conclusions, and 6) reporting the results.
66. The survey questionnaire informed the judges that the inquiry involved determining the qualifications, training, experience, and education that members of the
Texas judiciary possess in the area of scientific methodology and analysis.
67. Six questions were demographic in nature. Four questions related to education and experience with scientific methodology evaluation. Three questions involved
their opinions on judicial ability and training to make the Daubert analysis. Three
questions involved their exposure to the case law and discussions on the Daubert and
Robinson cases.
68. Professor Barbara Hart, of the University of Texas at Tyler, reviewed and
modified the survey to conform to acceptable survey question techniques and to
result in raw data which could then be easily interpreted and analyzed. Dr. Hart has
her Ph.D. in Criminal Justice from Sam Houston State University with an emphasis in
research. Dr. Hart has more than 20 years of experience as a criminologist and is an
expert in the criminal justice system. Her specialties within the field include violent
crime analysis, program evaluation, research and statistical methodology, corrections
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reported receiving some high school education in the analysis of scientific methodology, the judges reported only an average of three high
school courses which discussed the method. Additionally, it is important to remember that this high school training for 89 percent of the
judges took place more than twenty years ago.6 9
The vast majority of judges (92%) did report receiving some undergraduate education which included scientific methodology. These
judges reported an average of seven to eight courses which included
some material on scientific methodology in undergraduate school.
Again, however, for 89 percent of the judges, this education was more
than twenty years ago.7 °

As discussed above, Texas Rule of Evidence 702 involves the judge
making an evidentiary determination of the admissibility of scientific
and expert testimony. 71 It is obviously important that judges and lawyers are able to understand scientific methodology as it applies in the
legal arena in order to prepare, present, or evaluate evidence under
Rule 702. However, 277 judges (83%) did not report any instruction
or educational background in the scientific method received during
law school. It is important to remember that all members of the
Texas judiciary attended law school prior to the Daubert and Robinson opinions. Perhaps the lack of law school attention to the evidentiary issues involving evaluation of scientific methodology can be
explained by the mandated use of the Frye test of admissibility during
the formal legal education of the Texas judiciary.72 Relying on the
general acceptance rule of admissibility eliminates the need for lawyers and judges to be able to independently determine the reliability
of the scientific methodology.
Only 28 judges reported receiving master or Ph.D. instruction or
educational background in the scientific method. Additionally, only
nine judges had made use of the scientific method in preparation of a
thesis or dissertation. However, since very few judges received additional formal education following law school, this number is insignificant except to emphasize the importance of formal law school
education in the requirements and practical application of Rule 702.
Understanding that the formal education of the judges occurred
some time ago as evidenced by their average age of over 50 years, it
seems that continuing legal or judicial education would have addressed the need for instruction on scientific methodology analysis
under Rule 702. However, only 29 percent of Texas trial judges reand juvenile justice. Additionally, Dr. Hart heads up several independent survey
projects gathering information in many different areas of interest.
69. Two hundred ninety-seven judges reported being over age 40. One hundred

sixty-eight judges (or more than 50%) reported being over age 50 with their high
school
70.
71.
72.

education completed more than 30 years ago.
See id.
See supra Part II.D.1.
See supra Part II.C.1.
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ported having received some type of continuing legal, judicial, or
other professional continuing education which provided instruction on
the use or analysis of the scientific method. Coincidentally, only 97
judges, or 29 percent, reported some practical or business experience
prior to assuming the bench where the judge was required to use and
analyze the scientific method. Therefore, 234 judges or 70 percent of
the responding judges reported no continuing education or practical
business experience in the use and analysis of the reliability of scientific methodology.
In light of the significance to a case's outcome of a judicial determination that evidence is either admissible or inadmissible under Rule
702, it is disturbing that more than 70 percent of the Texas judiciary
reported such limited, and potentially outdated, education or experience with the evaluation of scientific methodology.
D. Survey Results of Judicial Perception of Ability to Perform
Gatekeeping Responsibility

In light of the above results evidencing limited formal education
and experience in scientific methodology, it is interesting to note that
the confidence of the United States Supreme Court in the Federal judiciary, as enunciated in Daubert, is reflected in the confidence of the
Texas judiciary itself to serve in the gatekeeping role. More than 70
percent of the judges reported that they believed they possessed the
background, qualifications or training needed to evaluate the reliability of scientific evidence and methodology. Only slightly more than 15
percent (15.41%) reported that they did not believe they possessed
the background, qualifications, or training needed to evaluate such
matters. Fourteen and one-half percent had no opinion on their qualifications for such a reliability evaluation.
These survey results starkly contrast with the results indicating remote and limited actual experience and training in scientific methodology by these same judges. Perhaps judges believe that formal
training is unnecessary for the Rule 702 gatekeeping function. Perhaps they believe that experience from the bench during trials will
prepare them for the admissibility test. Perhaps they believe that they
are not required to be junior scientists and that their limited training is
sufficient to make an evidentiary determination. A final possibility is
that judges may merely determine admissibility under the old Frye
test7 3 and allow the legal fiction of confidence in the judiciary to uphold discretionary determinations.
It is unclear as to why Texas judges have such a high confidence in
their ability to perform the gatekeeping function. It is certainly clear,
however, that Texas judges believe, under the current law, that it is
important that they are able to perform the gatekeeper role. More
73. See supra Part II.C.1.
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than 75 percent (75.83%) of the judges believe that it is important that
a judge be able to evaluate the reliability of scientific evidence and
methodology. Only close to 13 percent (12.99%) do not believe that
ability is important, with approximately 11 percent (11.18%) of the
judges surveyed having no opinion on the issue.
It is significant that 24 percent of the judiciary either do not have an
opinion or do not think that it is important for a judge to be able to
evaluate the reliability of scientific evidence and methodology; even
though, under the current law, the judges are clearly required to make
that very determination. Litigants in cases which include complex scientific evidence may be disturbed by these survey results and concerned about the uniformity of the evaluations made under Rule 702.
E. Survey Results of Judicial Study of Daubert and
Robinson Case Law
A large majority of the judges expressed confidence in their ability

to perform the gatekeeping role74 while a larger majority of judges,75

law schools and continuing education providers76 believe that it is important for judges to be able to apply the Daubert test. Note, however, that of the 331 judges surveyed, more than 57 percent (57.70%)
had read the Daubert opinion, but an alarming 40 percent (40.79%)
had not even read the case. Of the same surveyed judges, over 59
percent (59.82%) had read the Robinson case, leaving over 38 percent
(38.97%) who had not read the opinion.
The fact that approximately 40 percent of the judges have not read
the landmark United States Supreme Court ruling and approximately
39 percent have not read the Texas Supreme Court's ruling may partially explain why 24 percent either do not think it is important or
have no opinion as to the importance of judicial ability in evaluating
the reliability of scientific evidence.
F. Survey Results of C.L.E.77 Providers and Law Schools

A survey questionnaire was also completed by Texas law schools
and providers of continuing judicial education in Texas.78 The results
raised additional concerns about the availability of adequate Daubert
formal legal training. It is important that lawyers who will be making
the proffer of expert testimony be adequately trained in the type of
evaluation the trial court must perform prior to determining the admissibility of this evidence. Law schools and continuing education
74. 70.09% according to the survey results.
75. 75.83% according to the survey results.
76. 85.71% according to the survey results.
77. Continuing legal education.
78. A survey sent to the nine Texas law schools resulted in four responding to the
survey. Seven continuing judicial education providers were surveyed with five responding to the survey questionnaire.
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providers clearly agree as to the importance of judicial competence to
perform the Rule 702 analysis.7 9
Yet, while the importance of adequate training is clear, more than
28 percent (28.57%) of the continuing education providers and law
schools do not believe that theircontinuing education programs provide adequate scientific reliability training. More than 28 percent
(28.57%) of the same educational providers expressed no opinion on
the adequacy of the continuing legal education. Finally, while 42 percent (42.86%) of the responding C.L.E. providers and law schools believe that the continuing legal education is adequate, the fact remains
that approximately 57 percent of the continuing judicial education
providers in Texas who responded to the survey cannot confidently
say that their programs provide the education, background, qualifications, or training needed to evaluate the reliability of scientific evidence and methodology.
If training is necessary to perform this gatekeeping role then where
will such judicial education occur? More than 58 percent (58.31%) of
the Texas judges surveyed did not believe that there is adequate training in law school to prepare judges to evaluate the reliability of scientific evidence and methodology. More than 24 percent (24.77%) had
no opinion as to the adequacy of law school education in scientific
methodology, while only 16 percent (16.92%) believed that such law
school education in this area was adequate. The total of 83 percent
who either do not believe or have no opinion as to the adequacy of the
law schools' education in scientific methodology may be understandable considering the elapsed time since most Texas judges attended law
school.
Even though continuing education courses have been mandated for
lawyers and judges in Texas for many years,80 more than 44 percent
(44.11%) of the surveyed Texas judges believe that there is inadequate
legal and/or judicial education programs providing the training
needed to evaluate the reliability of scientific evidence and methodology. More than 16 percent (16.62%) expressed no opinion as to the
adequacy of the continuing legal and/or judicial education on evaluating scientific evidence, while only 39 percent (39.27%) of the judges
believed that the educational programs were adequate. With 60 per79. Eighty-five percent (85.71%) of the C.L.E. and law school survey respondents
believe that it is important that a judge be able to evaluate the reliability of scientific
evidence and methodology, while more than 14 percent (14.29%) expressed no

opinion.
80. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. tit. 2subtit. G, app. A, art. XII, § 6(A) (Vernon
1998) (requiring 15 hours of continuing legal education each year). The requirements
for continuing legal education of Texas lawyers were adopted by the Texas Supreme

Court by order dated December 19, 1985. See also RULES OF JUDICIAL EDUCATION
promulgated by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals which requires at least 30 hours
of judicial education within one year of a judge taking office and at least 16 hours of
judicial education is required each year thereafter.
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cent of the judges expressing no opinion or believing that there is inadequate continuing education on scientific evidence evaluation, the
need for additional emphasis on Rule 702 training is evident.
The uncertainty of whether the legal and judicial educational providers are providing adequate training in the evaluation of scientific
evidence may explain why only 29 percent of the judges indicated in
the survey that they had received C.L.E. in this area. The lack of education in this evidentiary area may be explained by an attitude that
judges are able to make the evidentiary decisions on this scientific evidence without specific training,81 by a lack of emphasis in C.L.E. programs on the specific dynamics of evaluating the reliability of
scientific methodology,8 2 or by a lack of legal challenge to the admissibility of expert evidence based on a reliability objection.83
G.

Indications of Survey Results

The survey results seem to indicate that as the Texas bar becomes
more comfortable with raising a Daubert challenge, judges will need
to obtain additional C.L.E. to perform this reliability test. The large
number of judges who reported that they have not even read the high
court rulings dealing with scientific evidence admissibility demonstrates the need for well planned and presented information on the
parameters of this evidentiary rule and how judges should go about
conducting their preliminary determinations of admissibility.
As the law schools educate new generations of attorneys who are
comfortable with making a Daubertchallenge to expert testimony, the
judges will soon recognize the need for C.L.E. in this area and will
surely call for specific programs to assist them in making evidentiary
decisions within the framework of the appellate courts' legal directives. The survey indicated that approximately 13 percent of the
judges do not even think it is important that judges be able to evaluate
scientific methodology. Perhaps, as more Daubert challenges are
made and the full impact of Rule 702 and Rule 104 are felt in court,
the need for specific training in Daubert readiness will be universally
recognized.
81. Of the surveyed judges, several responses indicated that they believe a judge is
able to perform the gatekeeping role without becoming a junior scientist. Judges did
indicate that their legal training in applying evidentiary rules based on prior court
decisions and balancing the probative and prejudicial value of evidence was all the
specific training needed to apply the Daubert test.
82. There is a concern among some judges that the programs dealing with the
Daubert test are too general and do not provide the specific checklists to assist the
trial judge in performing a reliability test.
83. As with many new areas of the law, it takes time for the attorneys to become
well versed in the art of making a Daubert challenge. For many trial judges, cases may
not involve novel or complex scientific evidence which is challenged by the attorneys
and therefore they do not perceive a real need for specific Daubert readiness
education.
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Although both judges and the educational providers overwhelmingly believe it is important for judges to perform the gatekeeping
role, more than 57 percent (57.14%) of the C.L.E. and law school survey respondents do not believe there is adequate training currently
being provided in law schools to prepare judges to evaluate the reliability of scientific evidence and methodology. More than 42 percent
(42.86%) have no opinion as to the adequacy of the law school training on scientific evidence and methodology, but none of the survey
respondents believed that the law school training on the reliability of
scientific evidence and methodology was adequate for the preparation
of the judges to make this evidentiary evaluation. In an area of such
importance, law schools should revise their curriculum to assist in the
legal training for a Daubertanalysis. Since it is the role of law schools

to educate and prepare future lawyers and jurists, attention to this
important area of evidence law should be addressed.
IV.

FUTURE ISSUES IN JUDICIAL GATEKEEPING

A.

Harvard Panel Discussion

On March 5, 1997, during the spring conference of the Texas judiciary and the closing session of the Texas College for Advanced Judicial
Studies, a panel of experts on the Daubert case and its implications
held a discussion on the future implications and issues in judicial
gatekeeping s4 This panel, named the Harvard Panel, consisted of experts from around the nation, including judges, attorneys, law school

professors, and experts in various fields of scientific study.8 5 The purpose of the panel was to explore how Daubert was changing the legal

landscape in the rules of expert testimony admissibility.86 The panel's

84. The panel discussion was invited by the Texas Center for the Judiciary, Inc., to
the March 5, 1997 Texas College for Advanced Judicial Studies. The panel and materials presented for discussion were supervised by Charles R. Nesson and William F.
Weld, Professors of Law at the Harvard Law School, in conjunction with Jonathan
Zittrain, Senior Fellow at the Center for Law and Information Technology at Harvard
Law School.
85. The Harvard Panel included: Charles Nesson, Professor at Harvard Law
School, Boston, Massachusetts; Marcia Angel, M.D., and Executive Editor of the
New England Journal of Medicine, Boston, Massachusetts; Justice John Cornyn of the
Texas Supreme Court, Austin, Texas; Mr. Dick DeGuerin, attorney with DeGuerin
and Dickson, Houston, Texas; Mr. Robert Dickson, Attorney with Dickson, Carlson
and Campillo, Santa Monica, California; Mr. Fredric Ellis, attorney with Ellis and
Rapacki, Boston, Massachusetts; Justice Raul Gonzales of the Texas Supreme Court,
Austin, Texas (who did not participate in the actual panel discussion); Ms. Cathleen
Herasimchuck, attorney with Rusty Hardin and Associates, Houston, Texas; Honorable John Hill, Former Chief Justice of the Texas Supreme Court, Austin, Texas; Honorable Cynthia Stevens Kent, Judge, 114th Judicial District Court, Tyler, Texas; Mr.
Barry Nance, Attorney with Pauson, Nance and Norwind, Washington, D.C.; Mr.
Michael O'Neill, Judge, 193rd Judicial District Court, Dallas, Texas; and Dr. Shanna
Swan, Ph.D., California Department of Health Services, Berkeley, California.
86. See Thomas F. Allen, Jr. & Robert Rogers, Judicial Gatekeeping: Introduction: Judicial Gatekeeping in Texas 3 (Mar. 5, 1997) (unpublished article on file with
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specific charge was to explore the nature of the judge's responsibility
for overseeing the quality and sufficiency of circumstantial and scientific evidence and the range of judicial powers using court-appointed
experts to assist in the process.
The panel demonstrated, during its presentation, the wide and diverse interpretations of the impact of Daubert upon the legal landscape. Those in new and novel expert testimonial fields believe that
Daubert will liberalize the introduction of evidence in the trial courts.
Those in traditional scientific fields expressed the opinion that
Daubert will restrict the introduction of "junk science"" inthe courts.
Academicians engaged in a discussion about the use of court-appointed experts to assist the trial court in the determination of admissibility of novel scientific evidence."" Attorneys in the plaintiff's civil
law practice argued that this will be a complex pre-trial issue to be
considered by the courts but should liberalize the introduction of expert testimony in court. Attorneys in the defense civil law practice
argued that the trial judge must simply apply the rules of evidence in a
direct and expedited manner, much like the procedure which has traditionally occurred in Texas courts. And finally, the trial judges expressed concern about how Daubert hearings might bog down the
courts with pre-trial and in-trial hearings on admissibility of evidence,
what procedures would be most appropriate for dealing with the
Daubert hearings, and whether the trial judge needed any specialized
training to be able to make the Daubert determinations.
The concerns expressed by the trial judges on the panel and among
the judges attending the conference seemed to mirror the results of
the judicial survey. Specifically, judges understand that they will be
performing the function, believe they are capable of performing the
gatekeeping function, and, yet, questioned what additional training
was needed for the trial judge to efficiently perform this admissibility
test.
Several contributors to the Harvard panel's literature presentation
discussed important areas of concern raised by Daubert.8 9
the Texas Wesleyan Law Review) (article presented to the 1997 Texas College for
Advanced Judicial Studies, Houston, Texas).
87. See E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 553-54
(Tex. 1995).
88. See Daniel S. Fridman & J. Scott Janoe, Judicial Gatekeeping: What are the
Procedural Issues Involved with Judicial Gatekeeping? 93 (Mar. 5, 1997) (unpublished article, on file with the Texas Wesleyan Law Review) (article presented to the
1997 Texas College for Advanced Judicial Studies, Houston, Texas).
89. In addition to the Harvard Panel presenters listed above, a number of law
students and faculty at Harvard Law School drafted articles responding to twelve areas of questions regarding the judicial gatekeeping responsibility. This compilation of
articles was entitled Judicial Gatekeeping and was a project supervised by Charles R.
Nesson, William F. Weld, and Jonathan Zittrain. These areas of questions included:
1. How has the role of judicial gatekeeping evolved in the United States?
(Article by Ketan Jhaveri);
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The Texas judicial survey results indicate that many of these issues
are real concerns about the Texas judiciary as they work to understand
and properly apply the Rule 702 test of admissibility.
One of the Harvard students, Ketan Jhaveri, points out that the
traditional tug of war between judges and juries in the evaluation of
evidence may have shifted to a three-way tug between expert witnesses, attorneys, and judges in making a preliminary ruling on admissibility under Rule 104 and 702.90 This gatekeeping function may
change the nature of expert testimony presentation as a full understanding of the requirement of Daubert and Robinson impacts the nature of judicial decision-making in American courts. How the Texas
judiciary will implement Daubert is a critical issue to Texas
jurisprudence.
B.

JudicialAwareness of Daubert Issue

Daubert directs the trial judge to evaluate an expert's proffered testimony as to reliability and relevance. 91 As mentioned above, the scientific knowledge component of Rule 702 requires that the trial judge
examine and evaluate the methodology employed by an expert wit2. What is the influence of summary judgment on the development of judicial gatekeeping? (Article by James D. Walsh and Christopher Newkirk);
3. What is the precise issue to be determined in a Daubert hearing?(Article
by Eric Brown, Blake Snider, and Victor Svilik);
4. Is Daubert a liberalzing or constraining change from Frye? (Article by
Anne Gaeta and Elizabeth Sitnick);
5. Does Daubert apply to areas other than new science? (Article by Chris
Kelly and Derek Squire);
6. What is the relationshipbetween legal and scientific standards of proof?
(Article by Robert Gifford and Whitney Pidot);
7. How should testimony relying on epidemiological evidence and differential diagnosis be treated under Daubert? (Article by Nicklas Akers and
Nate Scott);
8. What are the procedural issues surroundingjudicial gatekeeping? (Article by Daniel Fridman and J. Scott Janoe);
9. Can Daubert hearings be judicially noticed or otherwise given precedential value? What effect has Daubert had on pre-existingprecedents? (Article by Miriam Cherry and Paul Decker);
10. What is the proper standardof review for a Daubert hearing? (Article by
John Daley and Kirk Damman);
11. Should differing standards of stringency apply in determining admissibility depending on the type of case, evidence or witness before the court?
(Article by Heidi Rosenberg and Paul Decker); and
12. How should judges treat the testimony of professionalwitnesses? (Article
by Hima Vatti and Shaun Palmer).
90. See Ketan Jhaveri, Judicial Gatekeeping: How Has the Role of Judicial
Gatekeeping Evolved in the United States 13-21 (Mar. 5, 1997) (unpublished article,
on file with the Texas Wesleyan Law Review) (article presented to the 1997 Texas
College for Advanced Judicial Studies, Houston, Texas).
91. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993).
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ness in making the determination of reliability.92 Additionally, the
trial judge must find that the expert's testimony assists the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue which is
relevant.93
This judicial gatekeeping requirement is clear in Daubert and the
subsequent cases exploring the Rule 702 duty. However, remember
the survey results reported that approximately 40 percent of the Texas
judges had not even read these important decisions. Clearly, future
issues in judicial gatekeeping will include the readiness of the judiciary
to perform this function and appellate review of the manner in which
this function is performed.
C. Gatekeeping of Methodology v. Conclusions
A current area of debate in the gatekeeping issue is whether the
judge is to review methodology only or whether the conclusions,
which may be inextricably linked, should also be evaluated under a
Dauberttest of reliability. 94 Judges are extremely reluctant and, as the
judicial survey demonstrates, perhaps unprepared to become amateur
scientists. With the lack of recent and focused judicial training and
education in evaluating the scientific methodology, concerns are certainly raised about judges determining the reliability of complex scientific evidence and the relevance of the conclusions reached by experts
based upon this evidence.
Texas has addressed this issue in the recent case of Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals,Inc. v. Havner.95 The court found that an expert's
scientific testimony is unreliable, even when the underlying data is
sound, if the expert draws conclusions from that data based upon
flawed methodology.96 In a lengthy decision, the court traced the requirements of Rule 702 and the task of judicial gatekeeping in not
only evaluating the reliability of scientific methodology in opinion testimony's foundational materials, but also the reliability of the scientific methodology in drawing conclusions from those foundational
materials. 97 The court reversed the trial judge's entry of judgment
upon expert opinion after the Texas Supreme Court determined that
the scientific evidence was unreliable and could not support a verdict
in the case.98
92. See Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711, 720 (Tex. 1997);
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 556 (Tex. 1995); Hartman v. State, 946 S.W.2d 60, 62 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); Kelly v. State, 824 S.W.2d
568, 572 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
93. See Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 711, 720; Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 556; Hartman,
946 S.W.2d at 62; Kelly, 824 S.W.2d at 572.
94. See Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 720-30; Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 557.
95. 953 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1997).
96. See id. at 714.
97. See id. at 711-30.
98. See id. at 730.
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This decision explains the complex nature of the judicial responsibility in evaluating proffered expert evidence reliability and relevance.
The court writes for pages about scientific methodology and the directive that judges properly evaluate the reliability of this scientific and

expert evidence prior to admissibility.99
More than any other decision, this case should paint a clear picture
of the significance of the judicial gatekeeping function and the extent

of education and preparation required of a judge in the determination
of the issues of admissibility. Concern over the actual preparedness of
Texas judges to perform the analysis discussed in Havner seems obvious to this author.1a°
D.

Frye v. Daubert - Liberalizing or Constraining

The debate continues as to whether Rule 702 liberalized or con-

strained the admissibility of scientific and expert testimony in Texas
courts. 101 Clearly Daubertgives the trial judge much greater responsibility as a gatekeeper than did Frye.10 2 Although the expressed purpose of Daubert was to clarify the proper standard for the admission
of expert testimony, °3 the case clearly contemplates that Rule 702

would regulate expert evidence which would not contribute to a sound
decision, 0 4 attaining that objective in court may be elusive. While

Frye asked the general scientific community to serve as the gate-

keeper 1°5 and Daubertrequires the trial judge to determine reliability

and relevance, 106 in practice both tests may now command the same
results in Texas. It appears, with the lack of scientific background of
the judiciary and with the expressed confidence in performing the
gatekeeping function, that evidence generally will be admitted and the
jury will be asked to determine its weight. As the judiciary becomes
more comfortable and capable in the new gatekeeping role, the de99. See id. at 711-30.
100. See id. at 732 (Spector, J., concurring). Justice Spector stated in her concurring
opinion that:
The Court today fails to heed its own warning that "the examination of a
scientific study by a cadre of lawyers is not the same as its examination by
others trained in the field of science or medicine." I agree that the Havner's
expert witness testimony is not legally sufficient evidence of causation.
However, as a judge, and not a scientist, I am uncomfortable with the majority's amortious scientific analysis and its unnecessarily expansive application
of the Daubert standard. The majority's opinion, replete with dicta, gives
courts no practical guidance outside the context of Bendectin litigation.
Id. (citations omitted).
101. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 555
(Tex. 1995); Jordan v. State, 928 S.W.2d 550, 555 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Avila v.
State, 954 S.W.2d 830, 838 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1997, pet. ref'd).
102. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993).
103. See id. at 585.
104. See id. at 589.
105. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
106. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597.
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bate on whether Daubert liberalizes or restricts expert evidence admissibility may expand.
As the debate on the liberalizing or constraining impact of Rule 702
develops, litigators may soon become concerned with the high cost of
developing and preserving expert testimony which has an uncertain
chance for ever being heard by the jury. Even evidence which meets
the requirement of general acceptance may fail a particular judge's
Daubert test of reliability on other grounds of evaluation.
E.

Novel Scientific Evidence v. All Expert Testimony

Although Daubert dealt with "novel" scientific evidence, °7 Rule
702 does not restrict itself only to that area. Rule 702 deals with all
expert testimony, and there has been great national debate as to the
extent of the Daubert application. 10 8 Some courts have tried to narrowly apply Daubert to novel scientific evidence, 10 9 some to all scientific evidence,11 ° and others to all expert testimony, scientific or not."1
The Daubert case dealt with "novel scientific" evidence," 2 but both
the criminal and civil courts in Texas have made it clear that the Rule
702 analysis required of the Texas trial judges is not limited to "novel
scientific" evidence. In Hartman v. State,"3 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that the provisions of Rule 702 as interpreted by
Kelly I 4 apply to all scientific evidence, not merely novel scientific evidence." 5 In Havner,' 6 the Texas Supreme Court found that the judicial determination of admissibility is not limited to "novel scientific"
evidence, but includes all scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge proffered under Rule 702.117
107. See id. at 582-85; see also Hartman v. State, 917 S.W.2d 115, 120 (Tex. App.San Antonio 1996), rev'd, 946 S.W.2d 60 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The court in Hartman argued that "[t]he courts in Daubert, Kelly, and Emerson confronted evidence
based upon novel scientific theory-bendectin in Daubert; DNA evidence in Kelly;
and HGN evidence in Emerson." Id. (citations omitted).
108. See Chris Kelly & Derek Squire, Judicial Gatekeeping: Does DaubertApply to
Areas Other Than New Science? 51-62 (Mar. 5, 1997) (unpublished article on file with
the Texas Wesleyan Law Review) (article presented to the 1997 Texas College for
Advanced Judicial Studies, Houston, Texas).
109. See Hartman v. State, 917 S.W.2d 115, 120 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996),
rev'd, 946 S.W.2d 60 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
110. See Thomas v. Newton, 42 F.3d 1266 (9th Cir. 1994).
111. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549 (Tex.
1995); Forte v. State, 935 S.W.2d 172 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1996, pet. ref'd).
112. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 582-85 (1993).
113. 946 S.W.2d 60 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
114. Kelly v. State, 824 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
115. Hartman, 946 S.W.2d at 63.
116. See Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1997).
117. See id. at 731.
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Recent decisions in Texas have made it clear that the Rule 702 analysis discussed in Daubertis required in even the soft sciences.1 18 Additionally, the Texas Supreme Court has firmly stated that the Rule
702 and Daubert analysis is required with all expert testimony.' t 9 The
20
Texas Supreme Court in Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc.1
concluded that:
[W]hether an expert's testimony is based on "scientific, technical or
other specialized knowledge," Daubert and Rule 702 demand that
the district court evaluate the methods, analysis, and principles relied upon in reaching the opinion. The court should ensure that the
opinion comports with applicable professional standards outside the
courtroom and that it "will have a 1reliable
basis in the knowledge
21
and experience of [the] discipline.'
The Texas Supreme Court agreed with the Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuits decisions applying Rule 702's Daubert type analysis
in all cases where any expert testimony is presented. 2 2 The court
noted that:
Nothing in the language of the rule suggests that opinions based on
scientific knowledge should be treated any differently than opinions
based on technical or other specialized knowledge. It would be an
odd rule of evidence that insisted that some expert opinions be reliable but not others. All expert testimony should be shown to be
reliable before it is admitted. 2 3
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Nenno v. State1 2 4 has also
applied the Rule 702 and Daubert analysis to not only scientific evidence but to nonscientific expert testimony. 1 25 The court found that:
[t]he question we confront today is whether Kelly is applicable to
nonscientific expert testimony (i.e. that involving technical or other
118. See Nenno v. State, 970 S.W.2d 549, 560 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998); Weatherford
v. State, 975 S.W.2d 323, 323-24 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998); $18,800 in U.S. Currency v.
State, 961 S.W.2d 257, 265 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no writ); see also
Kelly, 824 S.W.2d at 573; Fowler v. State, 958 S.W.2d 853, 863-64 (Tex. App.-Waco
1997), affid, 991 S.W.2d 258 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). The Fowler court stated:
The fact that it may be more difficult to assess the relidbility of testimony
regarding the "soft sciences" does not justify eliminating the reliability requirement. We believe that the rule itself extends the responsibility of the
trial court as "gatekeeper" to screening evidence from the soft sciences for
reliability. Whether such evidence will assist the jury in making an intelligent evaluation of the facts rather than obfuscating them depends largely on
the reliability of the testimony.
Id.
119. See Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc., 972 S.W.2d 713 (Tex. 1998).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 725-26 (quoting Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984, 991 (5th Cir.
1997)).
122. See id. at 726.
123. Id. (footnote omitted).
124. 970 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
125. See id. at 560.
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specialized knowledge). The answer to that question is a qualified
"yes." The general principles announced in Kelly and Daubert apply, but the specific factors outlined in those cases may or may not
apply depending upon the contest. We do not attempt, here, to develop a rigid distinction between "hard" sciences, "soft" sciences, or
nonscientific testimony ....The observations
we make today apply
26

to all types of expert testimony.'

The debate over whether Daubert applies to all expert testimony
has been settled in the recent United States Supreme Court decision
of Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael.127 It is clear now that "the trial
judge's general 'gatekeeping' obligation-applies not only to testimony based on 'scientific' knowledge, but also to testimony based on
12 s Clearly Rule 702129
'technical' and 'other specialized' knowledge.
makes no distinction between scientific and other specialized knowledge. The Court found that
as a matter of language, the Rule applies its reliability standard to
all 'scientific,' 'technical,' or 'other specialized' matters within its
scope. We concede that the Court in Daubertreferred only to 'scientific' knowledge. But as the Court there said, it referred to 'scientific' testimony 'because that [wa]s the nature of the expertise' at
issue.13 °
F.

Procedurally, How Does a Texas Judge Gate Keep?

Rule 702 and the cases interpreting the gatekeeping function do not
give the trial courts much direction in how to procedurally perform
their duty. A variety of methods have been developing among courts.
Generally, the party seeking to exclude particular expert testimony
will raise the issue of reliability and relevance. This objection may be
raised by pretrial motions or in-trial objections. For the trial judge,
judicial management and trial momentum considerations may warrant
a pretrial order requiring such issues be raised pretrial.
Certainly the complexity of the science might dictate when to conduct the hearing. More complex and novel scientific or expert evidence may demand pretrial determination by the judge. More routine
or generally accepted expert evidence might best be heard and determined with a short hearing outside of the jury's presence. In Texas,
this is clearly left to the discretion of the trial judge. 3
During the Harvard Panel discussions, academicians raised the discussion about the appointment of court experts to assist the trial judge
126. Id at 560-61.
127. 119 S. Ct. 1167 (1999).
128. Id. at 1171 (citation omitted).
129. FED. R. EVID. 702.
130. Kumho Tire Co., 119 S. Ct. at 1174.
131. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 558
(Tex. 1995).
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in making the Daubert evaluation. Certainly this method is reserved
for only extremely complex and novel scientific areas and not routine
Rule 702 analysis.
Texas rules prohibiting ex parte communications 132 do not comfortably provide for court experts to assist in gathering information for
the court in its decision on admissibility issues. However, the use of
pretrial hearings requiring evidence presented by the in-court appearance of the expert, so that all parties and the trial judge may examine
the witness, may assist in the judicial decision-making.
Since the rules of evidence do not generally apply in the Rule 104
preliminary determination,133 courts may utilize affidavits, judicially
noticed facts, and other creative methods in acquiring sufficient information to perform the Rule 702 gatekeeping function. The new
gatekeeping function may favor a more proactive stance for judges in
weeding out unreliable and irrelevant expert testimony. The exact
procedural method for this function has not been directed and, therefore, leaves room for much legal and judicial creativity.
G.

The Question of Equal Justice under the Law under Daubert

With the elimination of the Frye test of general acceptance in the
scientific community and the implementation of Daubert judicial
gatekeeping in Texas courts, a concern arises about judicial decisionmaking consistency.
There is always the jurisprudential concern about disparate treatment of litigants in court. Debate about why in one court in East
Texas a life sentence is handed down for drug dealing while in another
section of the state a probated sentence is a more likely verdict is continually heard.
Daubert,however, raises new and concerning issues of equal justice
under the expert evidence admissibility decision. 3

Since judges,

though they have indicated remote and limited training in evaluating
scientific methodology reliability, will now be the gatekeepers on what
evidence the jury will hear, it is easy to be concerned about disparate
132. See TEX. CODE JUD. CONDUCT, Canon 3 B(8), reprintedin TEX. Gov'T CODE
tit. 2, subtit. G app. B (Vernon 1997).
133. See TEX. R. EvID. 104 (providing that in making the determination on admissibility, the trial judge is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to
privileges).
134. See Kelly v. State, 824 S.W.2d 568, 577 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (Clinton, J.,
concurring). Justice Clinton in his concurring opinion states:
In short, the kind of adversarial testing that would be adequate to replace a
Frye standard is simply not likely to occur. Trial judges will instead hear
testimony from only one side of the issue, frequently from the representative
of a commercial lab somewhere that has a vested interest in having its novel
theory or technique held admissible in a court of law. These circumstances
hardly foster impartial decision making.
Id. (footnote omitted).
ANN.,
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decision-making on admissibility. On a bright and sunny Monday in
East Texas an expert's testimony may be excluded as based on unreliable scientific methodology. The next gloomy Tuesday may find that
same expert testifying vociferously before another jury in another case
since that judge found the evidence reliable and relevant. In Havner,
the Texas Supreme Court writes for pages about conflicting federal
court decisions on the admissibility of expert evidence on causation.1 35
The court cites case after case where the expert evidence was found to
be inadmissible, and then136lists the courts that found the evidence to be
reliable and admissible.
This is not a novel concern of the law, but Daubert and the broad
discretion provided to trial judges may raise new concerns about equal
justice under the law.1 37 Although the general acceptance test may
have slowed the introduction of novel and yet scientifically sound evidence, it at least provided a more comfortable threshold test of general acceptance. It is important to note that the Frye test also placed
the general acceptance in the hands of the scientists and experts who
have extensive training, education, and experience, with relentless
1 38
peer review, in evaluating the reliability of scientific evidence.
Daubert and Rule 702 place this decision in the hands
of jurists, who
1 39
are legal experts, yet at best, scientific amateurs.
V.

CONCLUSION

The clear conclusion from Rule of Evidence 702 and the cases interpreting the requirements placed upon the Texas judiciary in performing the gatekeeping function is that the Texas judiciary will be
required to make the determinations of reliability and relevance in
ruling on the admissibility of expert testimony.
The judicial survey demonstrates that Texas judges have limited formal training or practical experience in the use and evaluation of scientific methodology. It is important that the judges possess the
qualifications and receive the necessary education for evaluating expert testimony reliability, so that consistency in the application of
Rule 702 may be accomplished.
The Texas judiciary, continuing education program providers, and
the Texas law schools have confidence in the ability of Texas judges to
provide this gatekeeping role. However, the source of that confidence
135. See Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 709-12 (Tex. 1997).
136. See id.
137. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 600 (1993) (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting). The dissent states, "[qJuestions arise simply from reading this part of
the Court's opinion, and countless more questions will surely arise when hundreds of
district judges try to apply its teaching to particular offers of expert testimony." Id.
138. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
139. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); FED. R. EVID.
702. But see Daubert, 509 U.S. at 601 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol6/iss1/3
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V6.I1.1

28

Kent: Daubert Readiness of Texas Judiciary: A Study of the Qualificatio

1999]

DAUBERT READINESS

does not appear to be based upon the background, experience or education of the trial judges as it relates to scientific methodology. Perhaps, the legal fiction of judicial confidence is important in an analysis
of evidentiary law. Nonetheless, confidence that is deserved and
earned would be far more comforting in the real-life application of the
law.
Further development and expansion of legal and judicial education
programs in the evaluation of scientific and expert testimony's admissibility will assist the Texas state judiciary in confidently demonstrating the capacity to perform the Rule 702 and Daubert evaluation.
Whatever the level of Daubert readiness, the fact remains that Texas
judges will determine the preliminary issues of admissibility of scientific and expert testimony. The continuing judicial education of Texas
trial judges in determining issues of reliability and relevance of expert
testimony is critical and necessary to assist in providing a quality and
uniform application of the evidentiary issues contained in Rule 702.
Since legal evidentiary determinations and ultimate decisions which so
critically affect Texas citizens are not a child's hide-and-seek game,
Texas jurists must be ready, willing and competent to perform their
gatekeeping function.
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